For Experts: Why This E-Voting is Acceptable

As experts (or knowledgeable individuals) in the field, you are likely wondering why those of us who, like you, opposed the implementation of e-voting at the national level for many years have suddenly “changed our tune” and offered an e-voting system.

In this article, we present our views on the difference between national voting and voting in private organizations and how this relates to the security of the entire system.

Let us emphasize that in this article, the term “e-voting” refers only to online voting, relevant to our tool, and excludes voting machines.

Absolute Security Does Not Exist¶

Absolute security (especially in digital systems) does not exist. It doesn’t even exist in physical systems, though it is easier to approach in that context.

The security of a (digital) system is always balanced between the types, scope, and sophistication of attackers on one side and the extent of system protection on the other. Any (digital) system can be made practically invincible with extensive protection, but this makes the system more complex and difficult to use—impractical. Consequently, the number of people who can effectively manage the system is reduced.

Therefore, the question “is (e-)voting secure” is not precise enough. The real question is, “is (e-)voting secure enough at the required level of usability.”

Advantages and Disadvantages of E-Voting¶

With any system, it is necessary to weigh the advantages and disadvantages based on our needs. Some general advantages of e-voting include:

Advantages

• Geographical Dispersion or the temporal unavailability of voters does not affect the process (assuming the time frame is wide enough and each voter has internet access).
• Digital Ballot no need for printing, and creation and corrections are quick and easy.
• Immediate Result Calculation results can be published within seconds after the voting period ends.
• Faster Execution no need to wait for mail delivery or for collecting and counting physical ballots.
• Higher Integrity of Results voters can independently verify the entire process.
• Low Cost no need for event organization or paying postage costs.

Disadvantages

There are quite a few potential disadvantages, but their extent depends heavily on the system you choose and can be minimized by selecting the most appropriate system for the circumstances. Some of these disadvantages include:

• Security Issues E-voting systems can be targets of cyber-attacks, including hacking attempts, malware, or even DDoS attacks.
• Lack of Transparency E-voting systems can make it difficult to verify and audit elections, as results and vote processing are often locked behind an electronic system.
• Technical Issues Hardware or software problems can lead to lost or miscounted votes, potentially affecting the final result. Service outages during voting can also be problematic.
• Questionable Anonymity Anonymity in e-voting systems is often pseudo-anonymous, as digital systems are inherently designed for tracking.
• Accessibility While e-voting can improve accessibility for some groups, it can also create barriers for others.
• Questionable Integrity There is a possibility of result manipulation, which requires a high level of technical knowledge for detection. Consequently, those without the necessary knowledge may struggle to trust such a system.
• Reliability Issues E-voting machines or systems can malfunction, and errors in their operation can affect election results.
• Verification Challenges The ability to verify and confirm results is required without relying on trust in the equipment manufacturers or those managing the system.

Weighing the Pros and Cons: A Case of National Elections

E-voting has many advantages, but most of them are completely irrelevant for national elections.

Geographical dispersion and the associated cost and complexity are not limiting factors—elections represent a negligible portion of the budget of the entity conducting the vote (the state). The main cost of voting is paying the individuals who work on electoral commissions—these are typically retirees, the socially disadvantaged, or young people—we could say that this money provides more than just the execution of the vote.

The speed of organizing the vote is not as important due to the extensive process (electoral tasks begin months before election day) since there is enough time. Simplifying the voting process will not increase its frequency, as it is already dependent on other constitutional, legal, and political-social constraints.

The speed of result calculation is already satisfactory due to digital reporting and can be further improved within the current framework.

The integrity of the result achieved by traditional physical voting cannot be matched (even theoretically) by a digital system, simply because digital voting occurs at home—this means that someone with physical presence (looking over your shoulder) can monitor or even influence the vote you cast. This is a key disadvantage that national elections cannot afford.

The argument often highlighted as an advantage of online elections is the higher turnout of young people compared to traditional voting. This argument seems rather patronizing toward young citizens, as it assumes that the main obstacle to voting is the physical effort required to reach the polling station (implying that non-participation is due to laziness rather than another reason, such as political apathy). In countries where such a system has been tested (e.g., Estonia), it has been found that higher turnout does occur to some extent, but the difference is negligibly small.

Thus, digital voting systems bring no significant advantages to national elections while introducing a host of new security problems, making them completely uncompetitive when compared to the traditional system, which has been refined for this purpose over centuries.

We must consider that the reward for successfully compromising a national voting system is the state budget, measured in billions of euros, and an attacker could potentially influence the lives of millions of people by altering the political balance of power. The likelihood of an attacker with tens or hundreds of millions of euros at their disposal is almost certain.

In our view, the introduction of e-voting for parliamentary, European, or local elections is entirely inappropriate from a professional perspective.

Weighing the Pros and Cons: Private, Democratic Organizations

At the organizational level, the calculation is quite different. On the one hand, potential losses are much smaller—association budgets range in the tens of thousands of euros per year. Even for the largest organizations, we are talking about millions per year.

The likelihood of an attacker with the budget needed to compromise our version of e-voting is extremely low.

On the other hand, the advantages of e-voting are significant—lower costs, easier execution, and solving the problem of time and geographical accessibility for voters, which is crucial for conducting elections.

The most important challenge that organizations (especially smaller ones) may face when using an e-voting system is the requirement for a certain level of technical competence in the team responsible for conducting the elections. To address this, we have prepared a three-tier system that offers lower technical requirements in exchange for basic security (sufficient for less critical elections, usually in smaller organizations). Higher levels provide adequate security solutions for large private organizations (or more critical elections) with slightly higher technical requirements that are still relatively simple and accessible to such organizations.

Implementation¶

The core of the system is a unique, randomly generated voting code. These codes are randomly(!) distributed to voters through a digital channel (currently via email, but this can be upgraded to something more secure in the future).

Voters access the ballot through a link that already includes the voting code and cast their vote, which is then recorded under their voting code.

After the voting period ends, voters receive a CSV document containing all submitted votes along with the calculated results. This allows every voter to verify that:

1. They received the same document as everyone else.
2. Their vote was counted and recorded correctly.
3. The result was calculated correctly.

Architecture

The system consists of the following components:

1. Voting System Manages the election, displays ballots, stores votes, and calculates results. It also generates the necessary number of voting codes.
2. Ballot Distribution System Manages mailing lists, allows their verification (by sending an email with a confirmation button), and distributes the list of codes received from the voting system to the selected mailing list.

The systems are hosted on separate servers and maintained independently. Both systems are open-source and available for anyone to use. They include a REST API and CLI interface through which the entire process can be executed.

For Level 2 and Level 3, we have also developed:

• CLI Ballot Distribution System A simple script that the electoral commission uploads to a computer (whose security can be ensured procedurally), reviews, and uses to download the list of codes from the voting system and distribute them to email addresses.
• Proxy for Ballots Due to the hypothetical possibility of revealing a voter's identity through metadata on an HTTPS request, for Level 3, we offer the option for the electoral commission (staffed separately from the commission responsible for distribution) to collect ballots through a proxy server, removing all relevant metadata. This allows the eGlasovanje system to still handle most of the work (collecting and processing votes and displaying the ballot) without direct contact with voters.

The GUI interface of the eglasovanje.si platform is not yet available under an open-source license.

Business Model¶

You can read about the business model in a separate article.